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I. THE FEDERAL COURTS IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1982: INTRODUCTION
E ffective October 1, 1982, after a life span of approximately 117 years,'
the existence of the United States Court of Claims was terminated by
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.2 Prior to the passage of the
* Judge, United States Claims Court. B.B.A., City University of New York; LL.B., Co-
lumbia University. Although the author is a judge of the Claims Court and former commis-
sioner of the Court of Claims, the views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the
views of the court nor of any other judge of the Claims Court, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit or the former Court of Claims.
Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. See also W. COWEN, R. NICHOLS, JR., &
M. BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMs, A HISTORY, PART II, ORI-
GIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICTION, 1855-1978 (reprinted in 216 Ct. Cl. 1).
2 Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified throughout sections of titles 2, 5, 7, 10,
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Act, the Court of Claims had operated on two levels. Its trial functions
had been delegated to a staff of sixteen commissioners 3 designated by its
rules as trial judges." The ultimate decision-making power remained with
seven judges appointed pursuant to article III of the Constitution.' These
seven judges, sitting in panels of three or en banc, issued original deci-
sions in cases which did not require trials, such as those coming up for
decision on dispositive motions and on full stipulations. They also de-
cided cases on appeals from the Merit Systems Protection Board and
boards of contract appeals. In addition, the commissioners of the Court of
Claims, but not the judges, heard cases referred to them by either branch
of Congress for the purpose of rendering advisory reports.6
The Act turned the purely appellate functions of the Court of Claims
over to the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It delegated all
other tasks to the new United States Claims Court. Unlike commission-
ers, who had only limited authority to make recommendations, the judges
of the new court possess the authority to enter judgments which are final
if not appealed.7
Initially, the active commissioners of the Court of Claims automatically
became judges of the Claims Court for terms expiring September 30,
1986, or fifteen years from their original appointments as commissioners,
or upon their reaching age seventy, whichever is the earliest.8 New ap-
pointments are to be made by the President, with Senate confirmation,
for fifteen-year terms. The chief judge is to be designated by the Presi-
dent.9 Retirees may be recalled by the chief judge to serve as senior
judges in addition to the sixteen active judges.'0
II. JURISDICTION OF THE CLAIMS COURT
The Claims Court has inherited the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
with respect to "claims against the United States generally."" This au-
thority includes
15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45 and 50 app. U.S.C. (1982)).
- 28 U.S.C. § 792 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), repealed by Federal Courts Improvement Act,
§ 121(b), 96 Stat. 25, 34.
' CT. CL. R. 13(a) (28 U.S.C. app. (1976)).
8 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1976), amended by Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 105(a), 96
Stat. 25, 26-27.
6 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 133(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
I ld. § 167(b), 28 U.S.C. § 171 note.
Id. § 105(a), 28 U.S.C. § 171(b).
Id. § 121(f)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 797(b). As of August, 1983, six of the sixteen commission-
ers or judges had retired upon expiration of their fifteen-year terms. The President made six
new appointments to replace them and also reappointed two others whose terms had not yet
expired to new fifteen-year terms. Three of the retirees have been recalled.




jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort. 12
This general grant of jurisdiction provides the authority for the most
common types of claims formerly brought in the Court of Claims: tax re-
funds, contract adjustments and breaches, military and civilian pay, just
compensation for the taking of property, Medicare compensation, Indian
claims, and transportation of persons and property. With the possible ex-
ception of the civilian pay cases,"3 there is no reason to believe such cases
will not continue to be the most common types administered by the new
Claims Court.
The jurisdictional grant further provides that:
To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief af-
forded by the judgment, the court may, as an incident of and col-
lateral to any such judgment, issue orders directing restoration to
office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement
status, and correction of applicable records, and such orders may
be issued to any appropriate official of the United States. In any
case within its jurisdiction, the court shall have the power to re-
mand appropriate matters to any administrative or executive
body or official with such direction as it may deem proper and
just."'
Thus, while the court's general jurisdiction is confined to monetary
claims, the relief it may grant on such claims is broader, extending be-
yond monetary awards. This may be useful where there is a continuing
issue, such as whether or not a military officer was wrongfully discharged
or retired. If not for the court's incidental authority to require his restora-
tion to duty and correction of his personnel records, the officer would be
" Id. § 133(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
" The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 provided for a system of appeals to a Merit
Systems Protection Board from substantial adverse actions against government civilian per-
sonnel. 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. V 1981). Appeals from a final Board decision were formerly
brought to either the Court of Claims or a United States court of appeals. Those appeals
formerly brought to the Court of Claims are now subject to the grant of jurisdiction pro-
vided to the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement Act,
§ 127(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). Thus, few if any civilian personnel cases will remain for
suit in the Claims Court. Indeed, in Connolly v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1250 (Cl. Ct.
1982), one judge of the Claims Court held that the Civil Service Reform Act provides the
only system of judicial review of government civilian employee grievances and therefore the
Claims Court has no jurisdiction over such a suit, even if the Merit Systems Protection
Board also has no jurisdiction over the particular grievance. Id. at 1257-58.
" Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 133(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2).
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forced to sue for back pay each year. This authority may also be impor-
tant when a government official rather than the court bears the responsi-
bility of making an initial discretionary judgment or finding of fact. For
example, under a contract or statute such a responsibility might be
placed on a contracting officer or administrative officer.' 5
The Act also grants jurisdiction to the court in some contract disputes:
To afford complete relief on any contract claim brought before
the contract is awarded, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to grant declaratory judgments and such equitable and extraordi-
nary relief as it deems proper, including but not limited to injunc-
tive relief. In exercising this jurisdiction, the court shall give due
regard to the interests of national defense and national security.16
The House Judiciary Committee report states that the purpose of this
measure is to make the government "respect the rule of law" in the award
of contracts.' 7 The Senate Judiciary Committee's report states its expec-
tation that the court will use its authority in circumstances where awards
"would be the result of arbitrary or capricious action by the contracting
officials, to deny qualified firms the opportunity to compete fairly for the
procurement award."' 8 Both committee reports make it clear that the
court is not to delay or prevent the award of contracts for goods or ser-
vices which relate to the national defense or security.
Although the Contract Disputes Act of 1978's gave exclusive jurisdic-
tion over government contract litigation to the Court of Claims,20 other
courts have asserted jurisdiction to enjoin the award of government con-
tracts to others in violation of the law or regulations even in the absence
of specific statutory authority.2 It is fair to infer that the delegation of
authority in this field to the Claims Court in 1982 was based on the desire
to take advantage of the court's expertise in government contract law.
However, what Congress meant by "exclusive jurisdiction" remains un-
clear. A House committee report stated:
The new section 1492(a) does give the new Claims Court the
augmented power to grant declaratory judgments and give equita-
ble relief in contract actions prior to award. This enlarged author-
See, e.g., Fairfield Scientific Corp. v. United States, 611 F.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1979), appeal
dismissed, 655 F.2d 1062 (1981); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 58,
70-71 (1963).
16 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 133(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3).
" H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1981).
'8 S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1981).
Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1972) (codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 and scat-
tered sections of titles 16 and 28 U.S.C.).
"0 41 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV 1980).
" See Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1973);




ity is exclusive of the Board of Contact Appeals and not to the
exclusion of the district courts. It is not the intent of the Commit-
tee to change existing case law as to the ability of parties to pro-
ceed in the district court pursuant to the provision of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act in instances of illegal agency action. See,
e.g., Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). Nor is it the intent of the Committee to oblige lawyers,
litigants, and possibly witnesses to travel to Washington, D.C.
whenever equitable relief is sought in a contract action prior to
award. Although Claims Court judges will travel, they cannot be
expected to do so at extremely short notice. Therefore, for the
time being, the Committee is satisfied by clothing the Claims
Court with enlarged equitable powers not to the exclusion of the
district courts. The dual questions of whether these powers
should even be broader and of whether they should be exclusive
of the district courts will have to wait for a later date.22
In addition to the grant of jurisdiction under the general statute, the
Claims Court has inherited from its predecessor jurisdiction over a num-
ber of other matters. The three most significant of these are: (1) a claim
for the recovery of reasonable compensation for the unlicensed use or
manufacture of an invention or copyright by or for the United States (in-
cluding a contractor or subcontractor with the authorization and consent
of the government); 23 (2) a suit for a declaratory judgment under the In-
ternal Revenue Code2 4 requesting the redetermination of a ruling by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue with respect to the initial or continu-
ing qualification of an organization as one exempt from income tax or
contributions to which are deductible
5 and also as a private foundation 26
or private operating foundation.2 7 This jurisdiction is shared with the Tax
Court and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia;
2 8
22 H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1981) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Opal
Mfg. v. UMC Indus., 553 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (court had no jurisdiction to enjoin
award of contract by United States Postal Service); American Dist. Tel. v. Department of
Energy, 555 F. Supp. 1244 (D.D.C. 1983) (court had jurisdiction over post-award suits);
United States v. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Claims Court's
exercise of equitable power is limited to cases in which complaints are filed in the Claims
Court before contract is awarded). F. Alderete Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. United States,
No. 83-1003 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 1983) (Claims Court has equitable power to enjoin contracts
already awarded if suit is initially brought before award).
23 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1982).
24 I.R.C. § 7428 (1976).
25 Id. § 501(c)(3). This section includes as tax exempt organizations those corporations
and community foundations organized solely for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes. See id. § 170(c)(2).
26 Id. § 509(a).
Id. § 4942(j)(3).
28 28 U.S.C. § 1507 (1982).
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(3) a suit brought pursuant to a bill referred by either branch of Congress
for a report sufficient to inform Congress of the amount, if any, legally or
equitably due from the United States to the claimant.29
Other important types of matters over which the Claims Court has ju-
risdiction include Indian claims accruing after August 13, 1946, claims
arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or
executive orders of the President,3" claims accruing before 1946 which
were pending before the Indian Claims Commission upon its dissolution
in 1978,3' and claims for recovery of the cost of removal of oil and other
hazardous substances from navigable waters of the United States when
the claimant is wholly without responsibility for the discharge.32
Although the primary (but not exclusive) focus is on claims against the
government, the court's jurisdiction allows not only a set-off against a
claim, 3 but also a counterclaim against the plaintiff in excess of the
amount of the claim.34 The judgment on the counterclaim is filed in the
clerk's office of any district court and is enforceable as any other judg-
ment is. 35 Furthermore, the Comptroller General may transmit to the
court any claim or matter over which the court might assume jurisdiction
on the voluntary action of the claimant. The court is required to proceed
with such a claim or matter and render judgment on it. 36
2I Id. §§ 1492, 2509. Since 1966 this jurisdiction had been lodged in the commissioners of
the Court of Claims and not in the court itself. This anomaly derived from the decision in
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), stating that the conduct of congressional refer-
ence cases, a legislative advisory function, is incompatible with the independence of arti-
cle III judges under the Constitution, and the Court of Claims should therefore respectfully
decline to handle such matters. Id. at 582. In 1966 Congress delegated such functions to the
Court of Claims commissioners. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-681, §§ 1-2, 80 Stat. 958, 958 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (1964)).
As discussed in the text, infra, the Claims Court is not an article III court.
30 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982).
11 25 U.S.C. § 70n, s (1976).
" 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i) (1976). There are other types of claims over which the court hasjurisdiction but which arose infrequently in the predecessor court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1494(1982) (petition for an amount due to or from the United States by reason of an unsettled
account of an officer, agent or contractor); Id. § 1495 (claim for damages by a person im-
prisoned due to an unjust conviction); Id. § 1496 (claim by a disbursing officer for relief
from responsibility for loss, in the line of duty, of government funds or records); Id. § 1497
(claim by an oyster grower on private or leased lands for damages from dredging and similar
operations); Id. § 1499 (claim for liquidated damages withheld from a contractor or
subcontractor).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982).





III. CLAIMS COURT PROCEDURE
A. Decision by a Single Judge
The Federal Courts Improvement Act provides that the judicial power
of the Claims Court, except with respect to congressional reference cases,
shall be exercised by a single judge, who may preside alone.3 7 Again, ex-
cept with respect to congressional reference cases, there is no provision
for review of a decision by any other judge or panel of judges within the
court. This procedure is similar to that in the federal district courts.
A congressional reference case is decided initially by a single judge, but
since his decision is not appealable to any other court, it is reviewed by a
panel of three other Claims Court judges designated in each case by the
chief judge of the court when the case is filed.3 8
B. Assignment of Cases
In the Court of Claims, patent law cases were ordinarily assigned to the
two trial judges who had specialized in the field of patent law. Similarly,
the more complex tax cases were assigned to those judges with experience
in the field. This specialization at the trial level was offset by the fact
that the assignment of judges by areas of specialization was not followed
at the appellate level. Ordinarily the panels of judges were randomly
selected.
The Claims Court has adopted a practice of random assignments with
some modifications. A rule provides:
(1) After the complaint has been served on the United States,
or after recusal or disqualification of a judge to whom a case has
been assigned, the case shall be assigned forthwith to a judge on
the basis of random selection by the clerk, except that related
cases shall be assigned to the judge who has been assigned the
earliest case filed. With the consent of the judge to whom a case
has been assigned, the chief judge may reassign any case if he
deems such action necessary for the efficient administration of
justice. 9
The rule further provides that at the time the action is filed, or as soon
as known thereafter, the plaintiffs attorney is to file and serve on all
parties a notice of cases related by transactions, events, or questions, or
otherwise likely to entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by dif-
ferent judges.40
Although the principle of random assignment governs generally, the
17 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 105(a), 28 U.S.C. § 174(a).
s Id. § 139(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 2509(a).
CL. CT. R. 77(0.
0 Id.
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rules recognize that in practice it is impossible to maintain the principle
absolutely. This is because some cases are interrelated, while others in-
volve the same issue of law or the same mixed issues of law and fact. Also,
a judge may be occupied with the resolution of complex cases, making it
difficult to hear or decide cases which have been pending for some time.
A case may require a trial in an area distant from Washington, D.C., al-
though the judge to whom it is assigned has no other cases at that loca-
tion, while another judge may already have a docket of cases in the area
and can readily add another. For these and other reasons relating to the
efficient administration of justice, the rules provide that a judge may ask
for reassignment of one of his cases to another judge.
C. Place of Trial and Pretrial Proceedings
The Claims Court is a national court. The Act provides that "[h]earings
shall, if convenient, be held in the counties where the witnesses reside." '
Most frequently this results in the trial being held in the county where
the plaintiff resides. However, this is not always practical. There may be
a number of witnesses residing in different counties, and a location which
is closest to the majority may be the most convenient. On the other hand,
if the case warrants it, it may be most desirable to conduct the trial at
more than one location. Other practical considerations may also dictate
the location: for example, a courtroom may not be available for trial in
the county of the plaintiff's residence on the date the parties have agreed
on for trial; or the case may not be large or important enought to warrant
the judge making a separate trip to try it alone, but he may be able to fit
it in as part of a docket of cases to be tried in another nearby location.
Pretrial conferences are usually held in Washington, D.C. But if the
amount in controversy or the significance of the issue does not warrant
requiring plaintiff's counsel to incur the cost of an additional trip to
Washington, D.C., the judge may conduct such a conference by telephone.
D. Rules of Evidence
As in other federal courts, the proceedings are required to be conducted
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence. 42
E. Rules of Practice and Procedure
The Claims Court is not required to follow the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Act provides that the proceedings of the Claims Court
shall be "in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure as the
Claims Court may prescribe."4 To the extent deemed feasible, the rules
" Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 139(b)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 2503(c).





adopted October 1, 1982, follow the Federal Rules, while also reflecting
the differences in jurisdiction. Reflective of these differences is the ab-
sence from the Claims Court rules of rules on counterclaims against the
United States, cross-claims and joinder of additional parties, seizure of
persons or property, execution, judgments for specific performance, pro-
cess against persons not parties and condemnation of property. There are
also differences in the rules on class actions, substitution of parties, depo-
sitions, production of documents, and failure to make or cooperate in dis-
covery. In addition, the rules serve a function similar to that of the local
rules of a federal district court. They deal with remands to administrative
or executive bodies or officials, case management, contents of briefs, time
requirements, transfers from other courts, and referrals from the Comp-
troller General.
F. Pretrial Procedures
Prior to the Claims Court era, the Trial Division of the Court of Claims
developed a full system of pretrial orders and submissions. Although each
judge was free to use, modify or abandon the pretrial procedures, the pro-
cedures proved useful in refining the issues of law and fact and in avoid-
ing unnecessary discovery. The hope is that most Claims Court judges
will continue to use them. The standard pretrial order on liability re-
quires the plaintiff to submit the following statements to the defendant
and to the trial judge within a specified period of time (e.g. sixty days): a
list of his proposed exhibits (together with a copy of each exhibit to the
defendant), a statement of the facts he believes to be uncontested, a
statement of his contentions of fact and law, the names and addresses of
all witnesses and the subject of their testimony, plaintiff's estimated trial
time and preferred place of trial. Within a similar period thereafter the
defendant is required to make its submission. In this submission defen-
dant is first required either to concede the admissibility of each of plain-
tiffs proposed exhibits or to state the reason for objection thereto, and to
admit or deny plaintiff's statements of uncontested facts. In addition, de-
fendant must submit to plaintiff and to the trial judge its list of exhibits
(with copies to plaintiffs), uncontested statements of fact, contentions of
fact and law, list of witnesses and their testimony, and defendant's esti-
mate of its trial time and preferred trial location. Plaintiff is then re-
quired to respond to defendant's submissions. Similar standard pretrial
orders have been developed for purposes of determining damages and for
accounting, if the liability and damage issues were initially bifurcated.
In the majority of cases, particularly tax cases, the plaintiff, having
brought the suit, knows the facts necessary to establish a prima facie case
on liability and does not require discovery in order to make his initial
pretrial submission. The defendant, however, may need discovery to ver-
ify plaintiff's exhibits, statements of fact and proposed testimony. If so, it
may be necessary to allow defendant a reasonable extension of time for
1983-841
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discovery before requiring it to make its submission. Similarly, plaintiff
may need reasonable additional time to check on exhibits and statements
in defendant's submissions before making his reply.
After a suitable interval of time, the judge schedules a pretrial confer-
ence. If the case is sufficiently large or important, the conference is held
in Washington, D.C.; otherwise it is conducted by telephone conference
call. Some judges insist that the conference be held in open court with a
court reporter present. Ordinarily, the author's preference is that the con-
ference be conducted in chambers in a more informal and cooperative
atmosphere. The first order of business may be the admission of the ex-
hibits which have been conceded as admissible and of those exhibits
which are ruled to be admissible despite objection. Other exhibits are
merely marked for identification. Second, the parties are asked to prepare
a stipulation of the facts not in dispute, or, if it appears that some contro-
versy may develop, the judge may place such facts in evidence in his pre-
trial order. Third, if further discovery is required, its nature is discussed,
objections may be ruled upon, and a deadline may be set for it. Fourth, if
it appears that some or all of the issues may be disposed of as a matter of
law, one or both of the parties is ordered to file a motion for summary
judgment and a schedule is set for briefs. Fifth, if the parties propose to
rely on expert testimony, a schedule is set for exchange of the witnesses'
reports. Sixth, the likelihood of compromise is explored. Seventh, the
probable length and place of trial are discussed. Eighth, the date of trial
is set giving consideration to the time needed for completion of discovery,
completion of expert witnesses' reports, and consideration of offers in
compromise. Ninth, a pretrial order is prepared, setting forth all of the
agreements, determinations, and orders arrived at in the conference.
The use of the pretrial procedures has many advantages. It promotes
trial preparation pursuant to a court-set schedule, delineates the issues,
informs the court as to the nature of the issues, and enables the court to
determine whether the issues in dispute are of law or of fact and whether
they may be disposed of by motion. If a trial is to be held, pretrial proce-
dures enable prior determination of whether or not the issue of liability
should be tried separately from the issue of damages. Furthermore, the
pretrial procedures tend to limit the parties to discovery only in pertinent
and productive channels, enables the court to rule on discovery disputes
on a better informed basis, and encourages the parties to agree on infor-
mal methods of discovery so as to expedite compliance with the standard
pretrial order deadlines. By requiring discussions between counsel and
mutual disclosure of facts and contentions informed compromise is pro-
moted. If trial is necessary, pretrial procedures shorten its length by fo-
cusing only on facts in dispute.
G. Discovery




devices as had been available under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure-interrogatories to parties, requests for production of documents,
requests for admission, and oral and written depositions. The biggest dif-
ference was that in the Court of Claims, but not in the district courts,
absent a stipulation, the court's permission was required to invoke the
discovery procedures (other than interrogatories). Permission was ob-
tained by motion showing good cause. The Claims Court rules now paral-
lel those of the federal district courts, to the extent possible under the
law. The last qualification must be inserted because the district court
rules permit a party taking a deposition to invoke the aid of another dis-
trict court in the district where the deposition is being taken to order a
non-party deponent to respond." No similar procedure is available for a
Claims Court deposition. Another difference is that a federal district
court may hold a non-party deponent in contempt for failure to obey an
order to answer a question."5 No statute directly gives the contempt
power to the Claims Court.
H. Trial
Claims Court trials are conducted in much the same way as suits in-
volving the United States are in the federal district courts. There are
some significant differences in the incidents of trial, however. First, in a
district court the government is usually represented by the United States
Attorney for the same district, although he may be assisted by an attor-
ney from the Department of Justice or some other government agency. In
the Claims Court the government is almost always represented by an at-
torney from the Tax, Civil or Land and Natural Resources Division of the
Department of Justice from Washington, D.C., regardless of where the
trial is conducted. Second, a Claims Court trial is more likely to use en-
tirely live testimony than a district court trial is. The parties to the latter
are often forced to rely on depositions as a part of their own cases. This is
because a district court's subpoena power in civil cases is ordinarily lim-
ited geographically to the particular district, or to a place within 100
miles of the place of trial, or, in some instances, the state of trial.'6 In a
district court case, should a witness outside the trial subpoena limits re-
fuse to attend trial or to produce pertinent records voluntarily, deposi-
tions must be relied on. On the other hand, the Claims Court subpoena is
not similarily limited geographically;47 because the court is a national one
whose judges may sit anywhere in the United States where the witnesses
reside, a Claims Court trial is more likely to be conducted with live testi-
mony. A third difference is that portions of a Claims Court trial may be
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
45 Id. 37(b).
41 Id. 45(e)(1).
47 28 U.S.C. § 2521 (1982).
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conducted in more than one federal district at different times, to suit the
availability of witnesses, counsel and the judge. Fourth, in the old Court
of Claims it was common practice to separate the issues of liability and
damages, with the liability issue to be tried first. The Trial Division's
decision on liability was appealable to the court, and, therefore, there was
a final decision on liability before the issue of damages was tried. Al-
though a determination on liability by the new Claims Court is not a final
judgment and hence may not be appealed to the Court of Appeals before
the amount of the judgment is determined, it appears likely that the
Claims Court judges will, for the most part, continue such separation of
issues. This separation promotes judicial efficiency because, if there is no
liability, difficult accounting and other quantum issues need never be
reached. Furthermore, once the government has been found liable, the
parties frequently stipulate the dollar effect thereof. Last, the court fur-
nishes a court reporter for each trial conducted in the United States, and
a transcript of the testimony is furnished to the court and to counsel who
wishes to pay for a copy. Proposed findings and briefs may then be ar-
gued on the basis of record references. This enables more precise use of
the record, both by the parties and by the court. The flexibility which
characterizes the trial procedures described above is a factor which has
encouraged litigants to bring more complex tax cases in the Court of
Claims and new Claims Court even though equivalent jurisdiction has
also been available in the district courts. 8
L Post-Trial Procedures
The Court of Claims rules provided that, unless otherwise ordered by
the trial judge, the court reporter was to file the transcript of the trial
proceedings, including the exhibits, with the clerk within thirty days after
the conclusion of the trial session.49 Thereafter, the trial judge filed an
order with the clerk, declaring that the proof had been closed. 50 Unless
otherwise ordered by the trial judge, the plaintiff then had thirty days in
which to file requested findings of fact and a brief on the questions of
law; the defendant then had thirty days within which to file his requested
findings, objections to plaintiff's findings and brief; plaintiff then had
twenty days to file his objections and reply brief. 1
As of September 30, 1981, there were 2,677 tax refund suits, aggregating some
$546,005,000, pending in the district courts, courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court. See
1981 I.R.S. ANN. REP. 77. The comparable figures for the Court of Claims were 837 suits,
aggregating $649,433,000. Id. Thus the average dollar amount per district court suit was
$203,961, and $775,905 per Court of Claims suit. Id. The comparisons for prior years have
been similar, and there is no reason to believe that the Claims Court experience will be
different.
" CT. CL. R. 122(d) (28 U.S.C. app. (1976)).
60 Id. 134(a).




Requested findings were required to be in the form of distinctly num-
bered propositions of fact, and both findings and objections were to be
supported by citations to the record.2 The trial judge's decision on the
merits then set out in separate parts his findings of fact and his opinion
and recommended conclusion of law.5 3
The Claims Court rules continue to provide that the court reporter is to
file the transcript of trial proceedings and exhibits with the clerk within
thirty days after conclusion of the trial session.5 4 However, the post-trial
proceedings thereafter are not prescribed by the Claims Court rules. Each
judge sets his own requirements as to findings, briefs, and time for filing
in each case.
The Claims Court rules provide that the court shall find the facts spe-
cifically and state separately its conclusions of law.5 But they also state
that requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review, and
that if an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed it will be sufficient
if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein.56
Regardless of whether or not they are required, astute counsel will most
likely continue to submit proposed findings in the form of distinctly num-
bered propositions of fact, supported by citations to the record, and spe-
cific objections to his opponent's findings similarly supported. This
method remains the most efficient one by which to argue the facts.
J. Oral Argument
One Claims Court rule provides that "[t]he judge may determine mo-
tions and cases on the merits without oral argument upon written state-
ment of reasons in support and opposition. ' 57 It further provides that
"[a]ll conferences, oral argument, trials and other appearances shall be
scheduled by the judge by order filed with the clerk.""8 By statute the
rules applicable to review panels in congressional reference cases must
include provision for submitting the report of the hearing officer to the
parties "for consideration, exception and argument before the panel. '"59
Pursuant to that mandate, the congressional reference case rules relating
to oral argument state that the presiding officer of the review panel in
each case shall establish a schedule for the parties to file requests for oral
argument.6 0 Neither the statutes nor the rules require the hearing of oral
filing of requested findings and briefs, seriatim filing was the more common procedure.
52 Id. 134(d)(1).
53 Id. 134(h).
°' CL. CT. R. 39(b)(3).
Id. 52(a). This rule is identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
56 CL. CT. R. 52(a).
5' Id. 77.1(a).
58 Id. 77.1(b).
59 28 U.S.C. § 2509(d) (1982).
00 CL. CT. R. app. D § 10.
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arguments on every case, or any class of cases, or on any briefs or mo-
tions. Any party who deems it important should request oral argument by
motion. Even if no party requests it, the judge may nevertheless order
oral argument if he believes it will assist him.
Since the court has nationwide jurisdiction, many plaintiffs and their
attorneys are located at a considerable distance from Washington, D.C. If
a case is not large enough to warrant the expense of an additional trip to
Washington, the party should consider the possibility of requesting oral
argument by telephone. Each judge has had installed a telephone with
conference capability and a speaker phone, to enable oral argument in
this form.
IV. APPEALS
An appeal from a final decision of the Claims Court is exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit."
Such an appeal is initiated by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of
the Claims Court within the time and in the manner generally prescribed
for appeals to United States courts of appeals from United States district
courts.2
Prior to the changeover, the standard of review for decisions of the trial
division of the Court of Claims was unclear. The Court of Claims rules
provided that "[dlue regard shall be given to the circumstance that the
trial judge had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the wit-
nesses; and the findings of fact made by the trial judge shall be presumed
to be correct."' But the same rule also provided that "[tihe court may
adopt the trial judge's report . . . or may modify it, or reject it in whole
or in part. . ." ' In its decisions the court took the view that since only
the appellate judges had the statutory responsibility for deciding the
cases, it could disregard the trial judges' findings and find the facts
itself. 5
The role of the trial judges as a separate court with the authority to
enter judgment unquestionably changes the posture of the cases on re-
view. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules provides that "[f]indings of fact [of
district courts] shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
61 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 127(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
62 Id. § 139(q)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 2522.
63 CT. CL. R. 147(b) (28 U.S.C. app. (1976)).
, Id.
" See, e.g., Righter v. United States, 439 F.2d 1204 (Ct.Cl. 1971) (court makes own find-
ings in valuation case by considering all the evidence rather than merely weighing the cor-
rectness of trial commissioner's findings); Bringwald, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.2d 639 (Ct.
Cl. 1964) (court has ultimate responsibility for determining findings and opinions and is not




credibility of the witnesses." 6 The "clearly erroneous" standard of review
has been defined by the Supreme Court 7 and it is expected that the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will follow that standard in re-
viewing Claims Court findings. However, as of this writing no decision has
yet been issued by the Court of Appeals which clearly defines the stan-
dard of review of a Claims Court decision. 8
Review of interlocutory decisions and orders of the Claims Court is also
available but on a much more limited basis than was review of decisions
and orders of the trial judges of the Court of Claims. Court of Claims
Rule 53(c)69 allowed a party dissatisfied with a non-dispositive order of a
trial judge to request interlocutory review within ten days70 after its issu-
ance in two situations: (1) when the trial judge stated in his order that it
involved "an issue of controlling importance or an issue of deprivation of
fundamental rights as to which there [was] substantial ground for differ-
ence of opinion and that the ultimate termination of the litigation
[might] be materially advanced by permitting interlocutory review" ;71 or
(2) when the requesting party made a "showing of extraordinary circum-
stances whereby further proceedings pursuant to said order would irrepa-
rably injure the complaining party or occasion a manifest waste of the
resources of the court or of the parties. ' 72 The Act now allows the Court
of Appeals in its discretion to permit an appeal from an interlocutory
order of the Claims Court only when the judge states in the order that "a
controlling question of law is involved with respect to which there is a
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate ap-
peal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation. 72 The Act is obviously more restrictive than was the rule
for the following reasons: permission for the appeal is in the discretion of
the Court of Appeals; the trial judge must make the qualifying statement;
the controlling question must be one of law; and there is no provision for
66 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
0' See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960): "A finding is 'clearly erroneous'
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 291
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). This rule
also applies to factual inferences from undisputed basic facts. Id.
8 But see Baginski v. United States, 697 F.2d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Baginski court
made its own findings on an issue in a case where the normal practice would have been to
remand the case to the trial judge because "the record leaves no question as to the decision
that must result from a remand." Id. at 1074. Judge Kashiwa dissented, in part, on the
ground that "this court and the Claims Court are not a single court with both original and
appellate jurisdiction, as was ...the Court of Claims." Id. at 1077.




73 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 125(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2).
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review of an order involving an issue of deprivation of fundamental
rights. Furthermore, there is no stay of the trial proceedings unless or-
dered by the trial court.
Restriction of review to a "controlling question of law" will in most
cases prevent review of liability determinations in complex cases where
the issues of liability and damages have been severed for separate trial,
even where the trial or the damages issue may be burdensome and
expensive.
Review of the decision of a trial judge in a congressional reference case
is by a panel of three other Claims Court judges, designated in each case
by the chief judge of the court, rather than by the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.74 Appeals are taken by a timely filing of exceptions to
particular findings and conclusions of the hearing judge, rather than by a
general notice of appeal.75
V. IMPROVEMENTS AND SHORTCOMINGS IN THE EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE STEMMING FROM THE FEDERAL COURTS
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 198276
It is evident from the committee reports and the entire legislative his-
tory of the Federal Courts Improvement Act that the creation of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit from the Court of Claims and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was the primary aim of the
legislation; equally clear is that the transfer of the non-appellate func-
tions of the Court of Claims to the new Claims Court was a necessary but
less important incident thereof.7 Therefore, in evaluating the effect of
the Act on the efficient administration of justice resulting from the trans-
fer of trial functions to the Claims Court, one must consider in the bal-
ance the positive effect of the formation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit and its new consolidated appellate jurisdiction over pat-
ent infringement cases and other patent cases, which is not weighed
herein.
The most important improvement at the trial level is the ability of the
trial judge to enter a final judgment. A trial judge of the Court of Claims
was only able to recommend a decision to such court, and there was no
final judgment until the appellate judges reviewed the recommendation,
even where no exception was taken by either party. This frequently re-
74 Id. § 139(h)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 2509(a).
75 CL. CT. R. app. D.
71 See supra notes 16, 17. See also Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-1981: Hear-
ings on H.R. 245 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
" Those interested in decisions of the Claims Court may find a West publication, the
United States Claims Court Reporter, useful. The series contains cases decided by the




suited in several months of delay in the payment of a judgment. Now
judgment is entered immediately by the clerk when the decision of the
Claims Court judge is filed.
In addition, a Claims Court judge has considerably greater flexibility
than his predecessor had in the trial division of the Court of Claims. For-
merly, if a party filed a motion for summary judgment or other disposi-
tive motion in the Court of Claims, the trial judge's jurisdiction of the
case was suspended until the motion was decided by the court. This de-
termination could result in several months of delay. A Claims Court
judge, in contrast, may now examine the moving papers to see if there is
substance to the motion, and, if not, may deny the motion summarily.
Furthermore, the filing of the motion no longer automatically suspends
the pretrial preparations and the judge may insist that such preparations
go forward.
Equally important is the fact that, as members of a separate court au-
thorized to enter final judgments, the judges of the Claims Court have
been able to shorten decision time by applying a greater measure of flexi-
bility in their procedures than their predecessors could apply in the Court
of Claims. In simple and clear-cut cases, judges have been issuing orders
in lieu of lengthy opinions, and they have been able to eliminate separate
formal findings by incorporating the findings in their opinions.
On the other hand, the Act has created new problems at the trial level
which did not exist in the Court of Claims.
In the Court of Claims, a case which involved only questions of law
which could be fully stipulated or which could be decided on motion for
summary judgment, bypassed the trial division and was decided directly
by the appellate division, necessitating only one set of briefs. Now the
Claims Court must decide every such case first, and, if it is appealed, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must decide the same legal ques-
tion. Therefore two sets of briefs are required and final disposition may
take longer.
At least half of the cases in the old Court of Claims turned on questions
of law, which proceeded directly to the appellate division for decision.
Since all cases now begin in the trial court, the judges of the Claims Court
have more cases to decide. To keep up with their caseloads, judges may
have to introduce short-cuts, such as disposing of more cases by order
and fewer by opinion.
Since the appellate judges of the Court of Claims reviewed all varieties
of cases within its jurisdiction, it was feasible to have the trial judges
specialize and to assign cases on the basis of judicial expertise. The
Claims Court judges considered it inappropriate to divide the single uni-
fied court into specialized segments, and therefore they adopted generally
random assignment. Thus, to some degree, there may be a loss of
expertise.
The new court legislation fails to give the Claims Court specific con-
tempt authority. This raises questions as to how the court can enforce its
1983-841
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subpoenas to non-party witnesses and its subpoenas for the 
production of
documents.
The section granting new jurisdiction to the Claims Court to decide
protests by unsuccessful bidders on government contracts 
provides that
"[in exercising this jurisdiction, the court shall give due regard 
to the
interests of national defense and national security.
7 8 This evidently
means that priority should be given to such cases. 
It is difficult to assess
how many such cases will be brought, but they may 
well detract from the
ability of the Claims Court to give prompt attention 
to other cases.
A question may arise in the minds of some members 
of the bar as to
the independence of the Claims Court judges compared to district 
court
judges. The trial judges are carried over during the transitional period 
to
fifteen-year terms computed retroactively from their 
original appoint-
ments but not later than September 30, 1986. The judges appointed 
by
the President serve for fifteen-year terms. Unlike Tax 
Court judges, those
not reappointed are not entitled to automatic retirement 
benefits. Thus,
the judges have no greater job security than any other government 
em-
ployees, and in some ways less. It is obviously undesirable 
that judges
called upon to decide cases in which the Department 
of Justice represents
one party must simultaneously solicit the favorable 
recommendation of
the same Department of Justice for reappointment.
78 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 133(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3).
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